How 364 economists got it totally wrong
12:01AM GMT 15 Mar 2006
In 1981, Britain was at
an economic crossroads. Policies that the Conservative government, elected in
1979, had been implementing to deal with accelerating inflation and a
spiralling national debt were not working. Borrowing was rising. Interest rates
were moving ever higher. If things had gone on as they were, credibility in the
British economy would have collapsed. Investors, firms and trade unions would
not have believed that any future government could have restored fiscal and
monetary discipline. Britain
could have become like so many South and Central American countries in the
1970s and 1980s.
Instead, Margaret
Thatcher and her Chancellor, Sir Geoffrey Howe, changed tack. The 1981 Budget
increased taxes by £4 billion - an enormous sum in 1981 prices. This was
extremely difficult for a government elected to cut taxes. But by showing a
determination to cut borrowing, the government made it easier to control
monetary policy, too, as interest rates could be reduced. This helped convince
the markets, which were also worried that high borrowing would lead to high
inflation, because in the 1970s governments had financed their deficits by
printing money.
Mrs Thatcher and Howe
faced stiff opposition to this Budget, not just from the Labour and Liberal
parties, but also from their own back benches. Their determination was really
put to the test, however, when 364 economists signed a letter to The Times
stating that there was "no basis in economic theory or supporting
evidence" for the policy that the Budget was seeking to implement, that it
threatened Britain 's
"social and political stability", and that an alternative course must
be pursued.
The whole of the
academic establishment - including some luminaries of today - stood against the
government. The 364 included Third-Way guru Anthony Giddens; the current
Governor of the Bank of England; Monetary Policy Committee member Stephen
Nickell; and former and future Nobel Prize winners. Only a brave few stood out
against them. Indeed, it is said that Mrs Thatcher was asked in heated debate
in the Commons whether she could even name two economists who agreed with her.
She replied that she could: Patrick Minford and Alan Walters. As the story goes
on, her civil servant said when she returned to Downing
Street : "It is a good job he did not ask you to name
three." In fact, there were one or two others who deserve mention, such as
Terry Burns and Tim Congdon, as well as some journalists and politicians who
stayed firm and argued the case for what would today be described as orthodox
fiscal and monetary policies.
In many walks of life,
we listen to experts with respect. Three hundred and sixty-four experts would
normally command a lot of respect. But were the 364 wrong and, if so, why were
they so wrong? It should be mentioned that some of the 364 would not have
agreed with all the content of the letter. Nickell has said that he signed the
letter because it was "the only game in town". He agreed with aspects
of it, but did not agree with it in its totality. That is fair enough. The
letter was wide-ranging. But the majority of its signatories probably did
accept the letter in its entirety. Furthermore, Labour peer and signatory
Maurice Peston has said that there would have been hundreds more queueing up to
sign it if it had not been sent over Easter.
On the face of it,
they were wrong. The economic recovery that the 364 said would not happen began
more or less as soon as the letter appeared. Unemployment continued to rise,
but this was in the face of a highly regulated and unionised labour market and
wholesale industrial restructuring. A long-term fall in the rate of
unemployment had to wait until labour market and trade union reforms became
embedded some years later.
The 364 were wrong
because they believed the Keynesian consensus of the time. Indeed, they taught
it to nearly every undergraduate in the country. The textbooks used by nearly
all British undergraduates did not pay any attention whatsoever to
alternatives. It was as if economic theory began and ended with the naïve Keynesianism
of Keynes's immediate followers.
Howe chose not to
respond to the problems of the widening Budget deficit as his predecessors had,
by managing it through distortionary controls or by ignoring it. He faced it
head on and increased taxes. To the naïve Keynesians, the increased taxes would
lead to further contraction in the economy and no hope of economic recovery.
But they ignored the wider consequences. With government borrowing back on
course, Howe could reduce interest rates at a time when they had been rising
and when a high exchange rate had been crippling British industry. Thus lower
government borrowing meant lower interest rates. This alleviated some of the
pressure on industry.
These benefits were
reinforced in the medium term because, instead of credibility collapsing, as it
could have done had the U-turn the 364 demanded occurred, the government's
policy became more credible. Gradually investors came to believe that necessary
policies would be followed through and that they would work. They could plan on
the basis of lower inflation, lower interest rates and a government that would
repay its debt.
At the time, Minford
described the 364's letter as a "dangerous and dishonest game". This
is a strong charge against fellow academics, but is it justified? The charge of
dangerous probably is. The government could well have caved in under the
pressure generated by so many experts. If it had done so, the long-term
consequences would have been catastrophic. Unemployment of three million would
probably not have been avoided in the short term and, in the long term, steady
decline would have been the best possible result.
The 364's letter also
affected trade union "expectations". If unions expected the
government to U-turn, they would expect higher inflation and ask for higher pay
increases. This could have contributed to the growth in unemployment. But were
the 364 dishonest? Here Minford suggests that the evidence that the
Thatcher/Howe policies were both necessary and could work was before their
eyes. The alternatives of incomes policy and reflation had been tested to
destruction and had failed. The supporting theory and evidence for the
Thatcher/Howe approach had been circulating for some time, especially in North America .
Due to the
determination of a small number of politicians, backed up by a handful of
academics, the government prevailed. Even the 1997 Labour Government decided to
institutionalise the pursuit of sound money and fiscal policy by its fiscal
rules and by making the Bank of England independent.
There are still many
problems with the over-regulated British economy, which is stifled by high
government spending. More than ever, Britain needs politicians who will
stand up against the experts when there is a need to implement difficult
policies. Thankfully we had such people 25 years ago, when the temptations to
take the easy way out must have been so great: the consequences had alternative
policies been pursued do not bear thinking about.