Showing posts with label Financial sector. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial sector. Show all posts

The Prudential Regulation Authority

The government is dismantling the FSA and giving the Bank of England control of macro-prudential regulation and oversight of micro-prudential regulation.
It will create a new Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of England.
The Bank of England will be the top regulator in the new system and will create two new regulators in 2013. The first, a PRA, will be charged with regulating banks and other financial institutions, and will operate under the Bank of England. The second regulator will be a new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority.
Roughly 25pc of the FSA’s 4,000 employees will be transferred to the PRA.


The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was created as a part of the Bank of England by the Financial Services Act (2012) and is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of around 1,700 banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms. The PRA’s objectives are set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). The PRA has three statutory objectives:
  1. a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of the firms it regulates;
  2. an objective specific to insurance firms, to contribute to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become insurance policyholders; and
  3. a secondary objective to facilitate effective competition.
Quick links to four of the PRA’s key initiatives: i) Strengthening accountability; ii) Solvency II; iii) CRD IV; and iv) Structural reform, are available below.


The PRA is part of the Bank of England and is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of around 1,700 banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms. The PRA has a particular focus on the solvency of specific financial markets such as: Insurance providers, Buy-to-let mortgage lenders, Credit unions and other specialist lenders.

The Role of Central Banks Today





Could a financial crisis happen again?

Read and make notes:

The City of London’s most vocal “bear” has warned that the world is heading for a financial crisis as severe as the crash of 2008-09 that could prompt the collapse of the eurozone.
Albert Edwards, strategist at the bank Société Générale, said the west was about to be hit by a wave of deflation from emerging market economies and that central banks were unaware of the disaster about to hit them. His comments came as analysts at Royal Bank of Scotland urged investors to “sell everything” ahead of an imminent stock market crash.
Sources of risk
  • Liquidity – Whether enhanced capital and liquidity requirements, and the ban on proprietary trading by banks, have suppressed market maker inventories in relation to the outstanding amount of corporate bonds.
  • Non-banks – Whether the next contagion will originate in asset managers and fintech companies who are subject to less prudential regulation but compete with banks in credit intermediation.
  • TBTF – Whether post-crisis regulations have encouraged oligopolistic behavior by reinforcing market concentration and creating barriers to entry in banking, clearing, and ratings.
  • Securitization – Whether risk retention/other regulations designed primarily to respond to the subprime mortgage crisis are optimized to reduce systemic risk without suppressing systemic benefits in other asset classes.
  • Hyper-risk – The impact of quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates on risk-pricing mechanisms, and whether these policies have encouraged excessive risk-taking by investors seeking to harvest capital gains in a low yield environment, and by banks seeking to bolster profits by lending to riskier borrowers.
  • Mercantilism – Whether aggressive monetary stimulus, which tends to devalue a country’s currency and make its exports more competitive, will trigger competitive currency devaluation and other trade barriers by other countries seeking to manage their trade deficits.
  • Central bank divergence – Whether divergent policies (loosening in Europe/Asia versus tightening in the U.S.) will encourage speculation in the bond and currency markets.
  • Dollar-denominated credit – Whether emerging market companies who have borrowed heavily in U.S. dollars can manage any credit squeeze wrought by local currency depreciation.
  • “Drug-resistant” recessions – Whether central bankers have innovations, besides slashing interest rates below the “zero lower bound” and printing money, that will stimulate the economy without destroying government balance sheets.
  • Zero lower bound – The consequences of negative nominal interest rates (where depositors pay rather than receive interest to maintain accounts, but borrowers pay less the longer they take to repay their loans) on perceptions of lending risk, incentives to make loans to riskier borrowers (rather than pay to hold excess cash at the central bank), and on the stability of insurance companies, pension funds and other organizations with long- term liabilities and demographic risk.
  • China – Whether the government can command a soft landing of its economy, including managing its debt crisis and dwindling reserves.
  • Sovereign wealth – Whether funds run by natural resource revenue-dependent countries can manage the rapid liquidation of assets to cut budget deficits resulting from falling commodity (especially oil) prices.
  • Populism – Whether populist sentiment (left or right) will trigger decisions (such as Britain’s potential Brexit from the EU) that might hinder free trade.
  • Non-correlated risk? – Whether insurance-linked securities, which purport to offer diversification based on low correlation to other markets, pose a contagion risk in the event of a large-scale natural catastrophe and sentiment-based volatility.
  • Bailouts – Whether contingent convertible debt securities that automatically convert to equity (or are written down) when a bank crashes will obviate the need for taxpayer bailouts without inducing a panic that contaminates the entire financial system.

The 2008 financial crisis was sui generis, caused by the collapse of an unprecedented bubble in the value of one major financial asset—residential mortgages. Accounting rules accelerated these losses into the balance sheets and income statements of a relatively small number of large financial institutions, which were carrying these assets with debt. The fall in mortgage values seriously weakened the capital positions of these firms and threatened their stability. These factors are not present in today’s troubled economic conditions.
The fault of one government policy 
The 2008 financial crisis was the result of four converging elements, all linked to a single U.S. government policy: an attempt to increase mortgage credit for low-income borrowers by forcing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—the two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were the principal buyers of residential mortgages—to reduce their underwriting standards. The policy, known as the affordable housing goals, was adopted in 1992 and was pursued through two administrations until 2008.
First, over this 16 year period, affordable housing goals produced a deterioration in the quality of the mortgages outstanding in the U.S. Before 1992, Fannie and Freddie would accept only prime mortgages—loans with downpayments of at least 10-20%, solid credit scores and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios that did not exceed 38% after the mortgage closed. By 2008, however, the GSEs were accepting loans with no downpayments, low credit scores and DTIs as high as 50%. As a result, just before the crisis, more than a majority of all U.S. mortgages were subprime or otherwise low quality, and 76% of these mortgages were on the balance sheets of government agencies, primarily Fannie and Freddie. This shows, without question, that the government created the demand for these loans.
An unprecedented housing bubble
Second, new reduced underwriting standards created an unprecedented housing bubble. This is clear when we consider the effect of reducing downpayments. If a potential buyer has $10,000 to buy a home, and underwriting standards require a 10% downpayment, the buyer can purchase a $100,000 home. But if the downpayment requirement is reduced to 5%, the same buyer can purchase a $200,000 home. More money chasing any asset will inevitably cause inflation in its value, and once started a bubble feeds on itself. By 2008, it was nine times larger than any previous housing price bubble.
Third, before 2008, most U.S. mortgages were held by three different kinds of financial institutions—government agencies like Fannie and Freddie, leveraged funds of all kinds and banks in the U.S. and abroad. Because mortgages were generally considered good collateral they were carried with debt. Thus, not only were homebuyers becoming more leveraged, with 30 year fixed rate mortgages and low downpayments, but financial institutions were then further leveraged by borrowing to carry these deficient assets.
Fourth, many mortgages were held by financial firms in the form of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These instruments were backed by pools of mortgages, with MBS holders receiving payments of principal and interest that were paid into the pool by homeowners and passed through to investors. Banks in particular were encouraged to hold MBS by the internationally-agreed Basel standards, which reduced the capital charge for holding a mortgage from 4% to 1.6% if the mortgage was held in the form of a highly-rated MBS.


Virtually every aspect of the meltdown can be traced to federal policies, many of which were designed to boost home mortgages. It’s all laid out in Hidden In Plain Sight: What Really Caused the Worlds’ Worst Financial Crisis and Why it Could Happen Again, a new book by AEI’s Peter Wallison. It’s a must read for anyone who wants the straight dope on what caused the 2008 crisis. (Here’s an excellent review by Alex Pollock. Also,Wallison will discuss the book, this Wednesday at The Heritage Foundation).
Wallison’s book is a valuable corrective, because too many policymakers have been getting away with a false narrative.  These officials want us to believe the crisis had nothing to do with the government’s affordable housing goals, and that deregulation and private-sector greed caused the meltdown.
Yet the financial crisis was, in truth, firmly rooted in a set of ill-conceived government policies that allowed too many people to take out home mortgages.
How much did the financial crisis of eight years ago cost the world, cost all of us? There are several ways to tackle that question.
One could examine the public bill for bailing out the giant banks that fell over like ninepins. One could look at the mountains of public debt piled up in the wake of the crisis (as governments, thank goodness, carried on spending while tax revenues collapsed in order to stop their economies slumping into new depressions).
One could contemplate the hellish spike in unemployment across the western world during the slump itself – all those people thrown out of jobs as business confidence evaporated, all those wasted resources, those lives damaged.

Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson told an audience of bankers and economists at a hotel on New York’s Fifth Avenue today that many of the factors that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 are still in place. Asking rhetorically whether another crisis could occur, Paulson said: “The answer, I’m afraid, is yes.”


Commercial and Investment Banks











Commercial Banks

Commercial banking relates to deposit-taking and lending. They provide services to corporate and individual customers.
Some commercial banks have investment banking arms e.g. Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Commercial banks make their profits by taking small, short-term, relatively liquid deposits from retail savers and transforming these into larger, longer maturity loans e.g. in the form of business loans and mortgages
Other services of commercial banks include providing debit and credit cards, private banking, money custody and guarantees, cash management and settlement e.g. through cheque accounts, as well as trade finance.
Main functions of a commercial bank
  • Commercial banks provide retail banking services to household and business customers
  • They are licensed deposit-takers – providing a range of savings accounts
  • They are licensed to lend money (and thereby “create” money e.g. in the form of bank loans, overdrafts and mortgages
  • Commercial banks are profit-seeking
  • A commercial bank’s business model relies on receiving a higher interest rate on the loans (or other assets) than the rate it pays out on its deposits (or other liabilities)
  • This “spread” on their assets and liabilities is used to pay the operating expenses of a bank and also to make a profit
Objectives of a Commercial Bank
  • Commercial banks are profit-seeking businesses
  • Their main objective is to achieve a profit by earning more from the interest charged on loans than the interest paid to depositors
  • Commercial banks can also make profits from providing other services such as deposit security, currency trading, business advice, cheque and credit-card processing
  • Most commercial banks are privately owned but some in the UK are part or majority-owned by the UK government
  • The UK government owns 73% of Royal Bank of Scotland
  • It also owns a 10% minority stake in Lloyds Banking Group

Source: Tutor2u

Regulating the Financial System

The regulatory system for finance in the UK in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.
Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England
  • FPC’s main role is to identify, monitor, and take action to remove or reduce risks that threaten the resilience of the UK financial system as a whole
  • FPC publishes a Financial Stability Report identifying key threats to the stability of the UK financial system
  • The FPC has the power to instruct commercial banks to change their capital buffers
  • When the FPC decide that the risks to the financial system are growing, they may tell the commercial banks and other lenders to increase their capital buffers to help absorb unexpected losses on their assets (bad debts etc.)
  • These capital buffers are part of “macro-prudential policy” - prudent means being careful at times of uncertainty.
UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
The PRA is part of the Bank of England and is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of around 1,700 banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms
It has a particular focus on the solvency of specific financial markets such as:
  • Insurance providers
  • Buy-to-let mortgage lenders
  • Credit unions
  • Other specialist lenders
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) replaced the Financial Services Authority (FSA) on 1 April 2013.
It is funded entirely by the firms it regulates
The FCA has three main objectives:
  • Secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers
  • Protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system
  • Promote effective competition in the interests of consumers
Micro and Macro Prudential Policies
Since the global financial crisis, regulators in the UK and a number of other countries have placed increased emphasis on prudential regulation – i.e. putting in place safeguards for the stability of the financial system
  1. Micro-prudential involves regulation of individual financial firms such as commercial banks, payday lenders and insurance companies
  2. Macro-prudential regulation is designed to safeguard the financial system as a whole
Liquidity Ratios and Capital Ratios
Liquidity means the ease and cost with which assets can be turned into cash and used immediately as a means of exchange
  • Certain assets are highly liquid
  • Notes and coins that are legal tender are perfectly liquid
  • Money held in sight-deposit accounts is highly liquid because it can often be withdrawn immediately without penalty (although there might be a daily limit)
  • Other liquid assets might include treasury bills (short term government loans) and also stocks held in large listed companies (because these stocks are traded heavily each day)
According to the Bank of England (July 2016) UK commercial banks hold more than £600 billion of high-quality liquid assets, which is around four times the level they held before the global financial crisis.
What are Liquidity Ratios?
  • A liquidity ratio is the ratio of liquid assets held by a bank on their balance sheet to their overall assets
  • Banks need to hold enough to cover expected demands from depositors
  • In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the Basel Agreement require commercial banks to keep enough liquid assets, such as cash and government bonds, to get through a 30-day market crisis
  • A liquidity ratio may refer to a reserve assets ratio for a bank which sets the minimum liquid reserves that a bank must maintain in the event of a sudden increase in withdrawals
  • A high liquidity ratio may limit the amount of lending that a bank is able to do – it must maintain higher amounts of cash
What are Capital Ratios?
  • Capital ratios have become important as part of attempts to maintain financial market stability in recent years
  • A commercial bank's capital ratio measures the funds it has in reserve against the riskier assets it holds that could be vulnerable in the event of a crisis.
  • The European Union runs regular “stress tests” to check whether banks have enough of a capital buffer to weather difficult economic/financial conditions (known as disaster scenarios)
  • Banks must maintain sufficient capital which includes money raised from selling new shares to investors and also their retained earnings (profits)
  • Europe’s banks have raised €180bn since the end of 2013
  • But the size of “non-performing loans” has also risen
Core tier one ratio of Barclays Group from 2011 to 2015
The Tier 1 common capital ratio is a measurement of a commercial bank's equity capital compared with its total assets. This ratio is used to assess bank's financial strength.

Source: Tutor2u

Financial Market Failure

 Market failure occurs when freely-functioning markets fail to deliver an efficient and/or socially optimum allocation of scarce resources.
Moral hazard
Moral hazard exists in a market where an individual or organisation takes many more risks than they should do because they know that they are either covered by insurance, or that the government will protect them from any damage incurred as a result of those risks.
Asymmetric information
This type of market failure exists when one individual or party has much more information than another individual or party, and uses that advantage to exploit the other party.
Finance is a market in information – often a potential borrower (such as a small business) has better information on the likelihood that they will be able to repay a loan than the lender.
Monopoly / Market-Rigging
This type of market failure is effectively collusion or abuse of a the power resulting from a concentrated market.
When there is a small number of firms in a market, they may choose to work together to increase their joint profits and exploit consumers.
The Competition and Markets Authority report on UK banking in August 2016 said that “the older and larger banks, which still account for the large majority of the retail banking market, do not have to work hard enough to win and retain customers and it is difficult for new and smaller providers to attract customers.”
Speculative Bubbles
A bubble exists when the price of something is driven well above what it should be, usually due to the behaviour of consumers. 
Externalities
A negative externality exists when a market transaction has a negative consequence for a 3rd party.
A positive externality exists when a market transaction has a positive consequence for a 3rd party.
We can also talk about network externalities, whereby there are knock-on effects of organisations working together – you could describe this as synergy if the effects are positive, or discord if the effects are negative.
Principal-Agent Problem
This situation exists when one person (i.e. the agent) is able to make decisions on behalf of another person (i.e. the principal), but the principal is unable to adequately supervise the agent. This can result in the agent acting in his/her own best interests rather than the interests of the principal. 
Excessive speculation
This can be defined as a risky action in which a person or organisation tries to predict what will happen to the price of an asset and buys / sells accordingly in order to try and make a profit. A speculator takes advantage of fluctuations in market prices.
Incomplete markets
An incomplete market exists when the available level of supply is not enough to meet the needs and wants of consumers i.e. only a proportion of potential demand is met.
  • Around 2 billion adults worldwide without a bank account.
  • 10 million US households, and 1.5 million UK adults are also unbanked
Moral Hazard and Banking Instability
  • Moral hazard happens when an agent is given an implicit guarantee of support in the event of making a loss – for example insurance pay-outs or the guarantee of a bail-out
  • In the commercial banking industry, the belief that the government will absorb the losses that bank creditors would otherwise bear can lead to moral hazard.
  • This may lead banks to take on more risk than is optimal, since they believe they receive any private benefits from the risk taking (i.e. higher profits) while the government will bear the cost of failure (funded eventually by the tax payer)
  • Some institutions may be deemed “too big to fail” – leading to diseconomies of scale and increasing the risk of financial collapse
  • Guaranteeing the deposits of savers might also mean that banks can attract deposits by offering lower rates of interest
The Global Banking Crisis and aspects of Market and Regulatory Failure
  • Irrational exuberance
    • Bank and investors over-optimistic, herd behaviour
    • Failure to understand tail-end risks (or "Black Swan events")
  • Principal agent problem
    • Senior bank executives did not understand complex financial instruments such as CDOs
    • Executives unaware of the scale of leveraged, risky trading
  • Moral hazard
    • Deposit insurance, provision of central bank liquidity, and bail-outs made it rational for banks to take on excessive risk
  • Asymmetry of risk: Gains to private investors, losses absorbed by the public sector
  • Labour market discrimination
    • Would having more women as traders / executives helped to avoid the financial crisis?

Introduction to financial markets






Types of financial crisis








The financial sector